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Six FATAL FLAWS: A COMMENT ON BOPP AND NEELEY
ROY A. SCHOTLANDt
INTRODUCTION

Let us enter a scene that James Bopp Jr. and Josiah Neeley urge us
to allow:
In Judge J's courtroom one morning, this occurs: The judge is
about to hear argument between two leading local lawyers. As the argument opens, he says: "Gentlemen, you know I'm running for reelection and you know how much I'd appreciateyour support." Counsel
answer, "Yes, your Honor, we certainly support you." To which the

Judge replies, "Well, I haven't yet had any contributionfrom either of
you, can I count on you?"

To which each counsel responds, "You'll

have my check before I leave."

[Would you react to this differently if

one lawyer promised $1,000 and the other said he could send only

$100?] The priorafternoon, as the judge ended a jury trial with his customary in-chambers chat with the jurors, he asked them too for contributions.
As for Judge J's opponent: A respected local lawyer is considering
running against J. She's told by friends-eagerto see her on the bench
because they believe she'd be a stellarjudge-that she'll have to raise a
substantial campaign fund. In her view, campaigning is an unpleasant
hurdle but one she can tolerate,and she's confident she can put together
a strong campaign committee. However, when she learns that to be effective in fund-raisingshe'll have to do the solicitation herself she calls
off her effort.'

t
Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ. Law Center. He serves as a senior adviser to the
National Center for State Courts; he organized and co-chaired the 2000 Chief Justices' National
Summit on Improving Judicial Selection and 2001 Chief Justices' Symposium on Judicial Campaign
Conduct and the First Amendment. The author is greatly indebted to several wise readers of drafts.
I. The above scenario stems from the comment by an ex-President of the ABA shortly after
the Eleventh Circuit's Weaver decision, invalidating the entire Canon on personal soliciting.
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc denied, 57 F.
App'x 416 (11th Cir. 2003). I asked him whether he thought lawyers would be asked for contributions before or after oral argument. He said: "Why not during?"
The scenario, to one reader of these pages, is "far-fetched." But given the sweep and
absolutism of the Bopp-Neeley argument that limits on judicial candidates' personal soliciting are
unconstitutional, this scenario is not merely taking their position to its logical extreme. The point of
the scenario is to ask whether any limits on personal soliciting are constitutional. For example, the
Eighth Circuit narrowly tailored the Canon, drawing a line that is at least arguably sound. Republican Party of Minn. v. White (White 11), 416 F.3d 738, n.23 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Bopp-Neeley
misleadingly treat the Eighth Circuit decision as simply supporting their position. See James Bopp,
Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections: Davis, White, and the Future of Judicial Campaign Financing,86 DENV. U. L. REV. 202-204, nn. 50, 51,58 (2008).
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According to Bopp-Neeley, the only negative aspects of allowing
judicial candidates to personally solicit campaign funds are these: It is
"unpleasant and time consuming for candidates and awkward for poten2
tial contributors. Other objections ... are, iftrue, much more serious.,
Banning personal solicitation does "allow states to maintain the fiction
that judges are not directly involved in the campaign fundraising process." 3 Any bans on personal solicitation "do not serve an interest in preventing corruption" and are inconsistent with White and have been enjoined by four federal courts. 4 "What raises impartiality concerns is not
the solicitation of funds, but rather a judge's knowledge of the source...
. [A]ny impartiality concerns raised by the personal solicitation ...

are

inherent in the state's decision to elect judges and cannot be used as a
rationale to limit candidates' First Amendment rights."5
Allowing scenes like the ones suggested above has six fatal flaws.
The flaws listed here are not in order of priority because, although all of
Certainly some line-drawing may improve the Canon; the above scenario aims at two
points: 1)To say that no limits are constitutional, goes too far; e.g., the reader just mentioned considers it preposterous to argue that it is unconstitutional "to prohibit solicitation in the courthouse
with your robe on." 2) What line-drawing does make sense? I reject lines like these: if the soliciting
is outside the courthouse the same day as the oral argument; if the soliciting is to lawyers or litigants
in a pending or imminent case; if they come before that judge with any frequency or he or she is the
only judge in their jurisdiction or reasonably likely to hear any case they are involved in. In short,
any one-on-one or small-group soliciting by a sitting judge (or candidate for that seat) seems inescapably freighted with so much pressure, that there is undue risk to both impartiality in fact and the
perception of impartiality.
Bopp-Neeley claim that "any impartiality concerns raised by the personal solicitation of
campaign funds are inherent in the state's decision to elect judges." Id. at 204; but that assumes that
judicial elections must be the same as elections for non-judicial offices, which White rejected explicitly (and clearly correctly, see infra Part I.B).
Last on this: Bopp-Neeley equate the pressure in solicitations by judicial candidates with
solicitations by legislative and executive candidates. Bopp-Neeley, supra at 205. But a judge's
decisions, reached after a constitutionally cabined process, impact directly and specifically X lawyer
or litigant. In contrast, it is inherent in executive and legislative action that they almost always affect
many people, and all who may be affected are free to engage with the officials in all kinds of contact, argument and support.
2. Bopp-Neeley, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
At the outset let me note that I agree with Mr. Bopp and Mr. Neeley on several issues.
For example, on public funding (which I do not oppose but which I believe is severely oversold,
distracting us from steps that will be more productive), I agree on many aspects that they list and I
expect they would agree with others that I have listed. See Bert Brandenburg & Roy A. Schotland,
Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1251, 1254-58 (2008).
Although Bopp, Neeley and I do not agree about White and other issues, this comment
treats only the matter of soliciting campaign contributions, which has drawn little attention and is, I
believe, incomparably more important than generally realized. Even on this matter, I only note here
that regulation of campaign contributions is not subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247-48 (2006) (adhering to the treatment since Buckley); see also Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000). Even applying strict scrutiny, the Maine and
Arkansas courts have upheld this Canon since White, and the Third Circuit and Oregon Supreme
Court did so earlier. In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, 30, 838 A.2d 338, 350 (Me. 2003); Simes v.
Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 879, 884 (Ark. 2007); see Stretton
v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 141-43 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31,41 (Or. 1990).
3.
Bopp-Neeley, supra note 1,at 201.
4.
Id. at 203.
5.
Id.
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them are powerful, they would draw different priorities from different
observers:
1. For generations, and in almost all states with judicial elections,
judicial candidates have been barred from personally soliciting campaign
funds.
2. All states that have chosen to have some or all of their judges
face some form of election have also chosen an array of stateconstitutional differences between the judges and other elective officials.
We cannot ignore that array. Nor can we say that because there are judicial elections the campaign conduct cannot be regulated; an analogy is
our limiting highway speed even though we have superhighways and
powerful cars.
3. White is, to understate it, distinguishable. The lower-court decisions are, as noted more fully below, (a) far from the Bopp-Neeley position (Eighth Circuit), (b) only a sua sponte departure from White (Eleventh Circuit), (c) still on appeal (Tenth Circuit), (d) only a preliminary
injunction that explicitly did not review for constitutionality (Kentucky
District Court), or (e) flatly contrary to Bopp-Neeley (Arkansas Supreme
Court).
4. Not only First Amendment rights are involved but also litigants'
Due Process rights to an impartial judge, as well as protecting the Separation of Powers values served by preserving the differences between
judges and other elective officials.
5. Not only constitutionality is at issue. We cannot ignore how noholds-barred election campaigns will affect who will be willing to run for
the bench, and for re-election. Many, probably most, of the kind of people who would be fine judges are undeniably different personalities from
the kind of people who enjoy campaigns or are at least willing to get into
them.
6. To allow conduct like that in the scenes described above will
jeopardize public confidence in the courts to an unusually acute and demonstrable degree. Scenes like those above bring the risk, even the likelihood, that some observers will see little or no difference between contributions and bribes. Empirical studies of voters' reactions to the postWhite reduction of limits on campaign speech show there is little concern
about that change but high concern about campaign contributions.6

6.
James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy
Theory and "New-Style" JudicialCampaigns, 102 AM. POL. Sci.REP. 59 (2008) (Kentucky voters);
James L. Gibson, "New-Style" Judicial Campaigns and the Legitimacy of State High Courts: Results from a National Survey (forthcoming) ("When judges express their policy views during campaigns... no harm is done to the institutional legitimacy of courts .... At the same time, the current system of campaign contributions does appear to be injurious to courts.") (manuscript at 19-20,

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

I. SIX FATAL FLAWS

A. PersonalSolicitationof Campaign Funds

For generations, and in thirty-four of the thirty-nine states with judicial elections, judicial candidates have been barred from personally soliciting campaign funds; their campaign committees do the soliciting. As
the Conference of Chief Justices put it in an amicus brief,
[w]ithout this Canon, even the most highly respected judges will be
forced to join a "race to the bottom".... One can imagine the very
dire, yet very real, consequences if the Canon is stricken. Will
judges be free to solicit funds in the courthouse, before or after oral
argument (or, as asks a former ABA President, "Why not during oral
argument?")? Will judges be free to solicit from jurors? While new
Canons surely could limit such
extreme practices, the "race to the
7
bottom" is bound to dominate.

Three courts have stated the reasons for this Canon. First, the Third
Circuit:
[A]s a practical matter, so long as a state chooses to select its judges
by popular election, it must condone to some extent the collection
and expenditure of money for campaigns. Unquestionably, that practice invites abuses that are inconsistent with the ideals of an impartial
and incorruptible judiciary ....
There is no aspect of the electoral
system of choosing judges that has drawn more vehement and justifiable criticism than the raising of campaign funds, particularly from
lawyers and litigants likely to appear before the court. Plaintiff is
correct that the currently approved practices do involve the candidate
deeply, albeit indirectly, in the process. Nevertheless, we cannot say
that the state may not draw a line at the point where the coercive effect, or its appearance, is at its most intense-personalsolicitation
by the candidate. [P]laintiffs contention that this is the most effective means for raising money only underscores the fact that solicitation in person does have an effect-one that lends itself to the8 appearance of coercion or expectation of impermissible favoritism.

The Oregon Supreme Court wrote this:

on file with author), available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1023785 (follow "Download" hyperlink).
7.
Brief of Conference of Chief Justices Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants/Appellees,
at 20, 22, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004) (No. 99-4021). This
article draws upon that amicus brief as well as the CCJ's amicus brief at the Supreme Court in White
in 2002; I co-authored both briefs.
8.
Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 144-46 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The
Third Circuit was prescient in writing, "[tlhere is no aspect of the electoral system of choosing
judges that has drawn more vehement and justifiable criticism than the raising of campaign funds...
" The public's strong criticism has been consistent and widespread. See infra, note 47 (discussing
the results of many polls).
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[The Canon] protects ...the state's interest in maintaining, not only
the integrity of the judiciary, but also the appearance of that integrity.
...
The impression created when a lawyer or potential litigant, who
may from time to time come before a particular judge, contributes to
the campaign of that judge is always unfortunate ....
[T]he outside
observer cannot but think that the lawyer or potential litigant either
expects to get special treatment from the judge or, at the least, hopes
to get such treatment. It follows that, if it is at all possible to do so,
the spectacle of lawyers or potential litigants directly handing over
money to judicial candidates should be avoided
if the public is to
9
have faith in the impartiality of its judiciary.
And the Maine Supreme Court:
It is exactly this activity that potentially creates a bias, or at least the
appearance of bias, for or against a party to a proceeding. If a contribution is made, a judge might subsequently be accused of favoring
the contributor in court. If a contribution is declined, a judge might
be accused of punishing a contributor in court. 10
All three courts essentially found the same compelling state interests: "[t]he stake of the public in a judiciary that is both honest in fact
and honest in appearance . . . ."11 The most
recent decision, noted fully
12
below, strongly affirms the same position.
B. State ConstitutionalDifferencesfor Judicial Elections
All thirty-nine states that have chosen to have some or all of their
judges face some form of election have also chosen an array of stateconstitutional differences between the judges and other elective officials.
We cannot ignore that array. The Supreme Court has long recognized a
"fundamental tension between the ideal character of the judicial office
and the real world of electoral politics . . . ,,13 Acutely aware of that
tension, the states that have chosen some form of judicial election have
included in that choice an array of constitutional provisions unique to the
judiciary to assure that judicial independence is protected. Most of these
provisions would be unthinkable for other elected officials in the legislative and executive branches. For example, in all thirty-nine states,
judges' terms are longer than any other elective officials' terms.14 In
9.
In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 41 (Or. 1990).
10. In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124, 1 31, 838 A.2d 338, 351 (Me. 2003).
11.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 145; In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 40; see also In re Dunleavy, 838
A.2d at 346-51; Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977) (calling the state's
interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial system "grave and honorable").
12. Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 881-82 (Ark.
2007).
13.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991).
14. Except that Nebraska's Regents' terms are longer than their judges' terms. Of appellate
judges facing elections, thirty-nine percent have terms of ten to fifteen years and another sixty-one
percent have terms of six to eight years. Of trial judges facing elections, thirteen percent have terms
of ten to fifteen years, and another sixty-eight percent have terms of six to eight years. CrrIZENS FOR
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almost all, only judges are subject to both impeachment and special disciplinary process. In thirty-three states, judges are the only elective state
officials subject to requirements of training or experience or both (except
that in ten of those, the attorney general is subject to similar requirements). In twenty-three states, only judges are subject to mandatory retirement.
This pattern of provisions shows that the choice of elections, as the
Third Circuit put it, "while perhaps a decision of questionable wisdom,
does not signify the abandonment of the ideal of an impartial judiciary
carrying out its duties fairly and thoroughly." 1 5 The thirty-nine states
have recognized that, far from fulfilling the historic purpose in allowing
for the popular election of judges, any effort to treat judicial elections
like others wholly undermines the judiciary's independent role under
their constitutions. The states' balanced approach to the proper structure
for an elected judiciary embodies the understanding that
the word "representative" connotes one who is not only elected by
the people, but who also, at a minimum, acts on behalf of the people.
Judges do that in a sense-but not in the ordinary sense .... [T]he
judge represents
the Law-which often requires him to rule against
16
the People.
Judges are subject to the array of unique provisions because the
judges' jobs are so different:
[O]ther elected officials are open to meeting-at any time and openly
or privately-their constituents or anyone who may be affected by
their action in pending or future matters, but judges are not similarly
open; nonjudicial candidates [are free to] seek support by making
promises about how they will perform; [o]ther elected officials are
advocates, free to cultivate and reward support by working with their
supporters to advance shared goals; other elected officials pledge to
change law, and if elected they often work unreservedly toward
change; other elected officials participate in diverse and usually large
multi-member bodies; other elected incumbents build up support
through "constituent casework," patronage, securing benefits for
communities, etc.; almost all other elected officials face challenges in

INDEPENDENT COURTS, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE CITIZENS FOR INDEPENDENT COURTS
TASK FORCE ON SELECTING STATE COURT JUDGES 77, 90-92, 116-17 (2000).

Other unique provisions on the judiciary: in twenty-one states, only judicial nominations
go through nominating commissions; in six states, this applies even to interim appointments. Last,
in eighteen states, only judges cannot run for a nonjudicial office without first resigning. For citations to examples of all these provisions, see Brief of Amici Curiae Conference of Chief Justices in
Support of Respondents, at 6-7 nn.6- 11, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002)
(No. 01-521).
15.
Stretton, 944 F.2d at 142.
16.
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410-1l (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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every election; [and last, fundraising by judicial candidates is
uniquely constrained].17

To say that when judges face elections "an election is an election"meaning that these elections cannot be regulated differently from other
elections-would be to deny the differences between judges and other
elective officials, and to deny the recognition of those differences in so
many constitutional provisions. It would be like saying that because we
have superhighways and powerful cars, we cannot limit highway speed.
Of course regulation must be narrowly tailored, but the fact that the obsolete, never-enforced "Announce" clause was unconstitutional does not
sweep the field-as is explicit in the recent Arkansas Supreme Court
decision noted last in the following review of the decisions.
C. White is Distinguishable
White does not touch this Canon. "[The] solicitation clause fundamentally differs 8from the announce clause analyzed by the Supreme
Court in White."'
Bopp, who deserves credit for his successful argument of White, has
always read it expansively, even elastically. He argued, as a good lawyer, that the decision of the issue in White (the "Announce" clause's constitutionality) would not touch even the most similar Canon (the
Pledge/Promise clause).' 9 But ever since winning that case he has used it
(in understandable advocacy but merely that) to challenge the

Pledge/Promise clause, the solicitation Canon, the political-activities
Canon, and others.2z
In the first federal court decision after White, an Eleventh Circuit
panel in Weaver v. Bonner invalidated the Georgia Canon-a provision

that was law in thirty-four states-requiring that judicial candidates not
personally solicit campaign contributions but instead have it done by
their campaign committees. 21 But, the Weaver panel (1) acted sua
17. Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 IND.
L. REV. 701,716-17 (2002).
18.
Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d at 881.
19.
See Brief for Petitioners Republican Party of Minn., at 31, Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521).
20. Bopp has represented plaintiffs in more than half of the 33 post-White cases attacking
various Canons. E.g., Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 2008) (injunction vacated in part and certified in part to the Kansas Supreme Court).
21.
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315, 1322-23 (11 th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc denied,
57 F. App'x 416 (11 th Cir. 2003).
How has Weaver fared in operation? In 2008, in Georgia's only contested statewide
judicial election, an unofficial judicial campaign conduct committee succeeded in getting pledges
from most judicial candidates that they will not do any personal soliciting. With seven candidates
for this open seat, four signed the committee's pledge and, of the three others, one says he is doing
no personal soliciting. In the three election cycles in Georgia since Weaver, a few candidates apparently have done personal soliciting but not actively; the only certainty is that one candidate happened
to personally solicit the young lawyer who is "staff' for the committee. Apparently, after some
candidates engaged in personal soliciting, their opponents did the same to meet the challenge.

240
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sponte: the provision had not been challenged by plaintiff nor argued at
trial or on appeal (Georgia's appeal was from a decision limiting the applicability of another Canon); 22 (2) incorrectly read White to require judicial elections to sound the same as legislative and executive elections,
despite the White majority's explicit limitation to the contrary; 23 (3) simply ignored three contrary decisions, one by the Third Circuit, another
after White by the Maine Supreme Court, and one by the Oregon Supreme Court; 24 and (4) wrongly chose strict scrutiny. That panel's sua
sponte activism led it to sweep away the entire Canon, in contrast to the
tailoring by the Eighth Circuit, noted in the next paragraph.
The next decision on which Bopp-Neeley rely-the Eighth Circuit
on remand in White-did indeed find the solicitation Canon unconstitutional, but only in part. The court upheld the limit on personal solicitation but found that it must be narrowly tailored to allow a candidate's
"personally signing a solicitation letter or making a blanket solicitation to
a large group":
An actual or mechanical reproduction of a candidate's signature on a
contribution letter will not magically endow him or her with a power
that
to divine, first, to whom that letter was sent, and second, whether
25
person contributed to the campaign or balked at the request.
There is no question that the Eighth Circuit's line upholding the ban
on personal solicitation (thus banning scenes like those that open these
pages) but allowing "blanket solicitation" to large groups and also solicitation by mail (at least via mass mailings), seems reasonable, perhaps
advisable-whether one agrees with it, or disagrees as I do. Like the
Bopp-Neeley reading of White, this decision they more than stretch: they
distort it.
As for two other decisions on which Bopp-Neeley rely, one, as
noted earlier, is now on appeal.26 In the other, they cite a District Court
Gresham's Law rules again. Telephone interviews with a Georgia judge and (10/8/08) with Jeremy
Berry, Co-chair, Ga. Comm. for Ethical Judicial Campaigns, in Atlanta, Ga.
22.
All-out "judicial activism," which normally Bopp actively opposes. "[1]t is judicial activism that threatens judicial independence .... Judicial activism is at the core of the attacks on judicial independence." James Bopp Jr., PreservingJudicial Independence: Judicial Elections as the
Antidote to JudicialActivism, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 180, 185, 191 (2007).

23.
Compare White, 536 U.S. at 783, with Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1322-23.
24.
Sttetton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Dunleavy, 2003 ME 124,
838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31 (Or. 1990).
25.
White 11, 416 F.3d 738, 765-766 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
26.
Kan. Judicial Review v. Stout, 519 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 2008) (injunction vacated
in part and certified in part to the Kansas Supreme Court, which answered certified questions on
other issues, No. 100, 170 (Kan. Dec. 5, 2008)).
As these pages go to press, the District Court issued another opinion, saying that it had
earlier "inappropriately" enjoined the solicitation of funds provision; now for the first time considered its constitutionality, and found it constitutional. The judge ignored the narrow tailoring that the
8th Circuit had done in White II (supra note 25). Yost v. Stout, Case No.06-4122-JAR (D. Kan.,
Nov. 2008).
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decision that was only a preliminary injunction which explicitly did not
reach a constitutional decision; however, last month that court did find
the Canon unconstitutional.27
Most recent is a 2007 Arkansas Supreme Court decision-Simes v.
Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission-explicitly
against the Bopp-Neeley position, which they try to put aside as "out of
step" with White and as unduly concerned about "the subjective feelings
of those solicited. 28 What Simes says is that "[a]ttorneys ought not feel
pressured to support certain judicial candidates in order to represent their
clients"-which I would not characterize as mere "subjective feelings. 29
And Simes relies on much more:
Allowing a judge to personally solicit or accept campaign contributions, especially from attorneys who may practice in his or her court,
not only has the possibility of making a judge feel obligated to favor
certain parties in a case, it inevitably places the solicited individuals
in a position to fear retaliation if they fail to financially support that
candidate. Attorneys ought not feel pressured to support certain judicial candidates in order to represent their clients. In addition, the
public should be protected from fearing that the integrity of the judicial system has been compromised, forcing them to search for an attorney in part based upon the criteria of which attorneys have made
the obligatory contributions. Thus, we take this opportunity to acknowledge that, in Arkansas, avoiding the appearance of impropriety
is also a compelling state interest.
... In the instant case, the petitioner was found to have made direct,
personal solicitations [including to an attorney who "appeared before
the petitioner about two or three times a quarter and had cases pending in the petitioner's court at the time of the solicitation"] ....
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's finding.., it is very likely in the instant
case that the petitioner, or any other judge making such a personal
solicitation, would have a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion [for or] against [a particular litigant in
a case]" based upon that litigant's support.

27. Carey v. Wolnitzek, No. 3:06-36-KKC, 2008 WL 4602786, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 15,
2008).
28. Bopp-Neeley, supra note 1, at 204.
29. Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d at 882. A lawyer is
likely to feel pressured for several reasons: she may be concerned about being able to remain effective for her clients; she may believe the soliciting judge is unworthy of support; she may fear that the
soliciting judge's opponent is the kind of person who would keep track of who contributed to whom;
she may lack the funds to make a notable contribution; and/or she may well feel the personal solicitation and surrounding circumstances involve unprofessional conduct. Solicitation by a judge raises
possible pressures different from any raised by solicitation for non-judicial campaigns. That is why,
as Simes noted, the Canons not only address campaign contributions but also preclude judges "from
using their office for fundraising or membership solicitation at any time." Id. at 883.
Even totally subjective feelings may be rational, e.g., when one does all one can to avoid
contact with a person carrying a contagious disease.
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• . . Arkansas's Canon 5C(2) seeks to insulate judicial candidates

from the solicitation and receipt of funds while leaving open, ample
alternative means for candidates to raise the resources necessary to
run their campaigns. To this end, Canon 5C(2) provides that candidates may establish campaign committees to conduct fundraising on
their behalf. . . . [T]he state is doing nothing more than seeking a
balance between allowing people to elect theirjudges and safeguard-

ing the process so that the integrity of the judiciary and due process

will not be compromised. For all of the above reasons, we reject the
arguments presented by the petitioner and find that Canon 5C(2) of
the Arkansas Code of Judicial30 Conduct is narrowly tailored to serve
the compelling state interests.
D. Litigants' Due Process Rights to an ImpartialJudge

Not only First Amendment rights are involved but also litigants'
Due Process rights to an impartial judge. And also the constitutional
structure at stake in protecting the Separation-of-Powers values served
by preserving the differences between judges and other elective officials.
The Due Process Clause's guarantee of impartial judges, both as a
matter of fact and as a matter of perception, is a compelling state interest.3
As for the separation of powers: in choosing judicial elections,
states have not abandoned their concern with preserving fully separated
powers. The States know that if candidates for judicial office appeal for
voters' support on the same basis as legislative candidates-if they answer to the same electoral majorities-the courts run the grave risk of
becoming second legislatures. As electoral twins to the legislatures,
courts would lose the independence-and the crucial public perception
of that independence-required for them to discharge their high constitutional duty of judicial review.
E. Elective Campaignsand the JudicialPool

Not only constitutionality is at issue. We cannot ignore how noholds-barred elective campaigns will affect the pool of people willing to
run for election to the bench, and for re-election.
The whole goal of efforts surrounding judicial selection is to bring
to the bench people as suitable as we can find for the unique responsibilities and powers of judges. Debate about the strengths and weaknesses of
different systems has drawn more ink and sweat than any other subject in
American law. But the fact is-whether one applauds it (as do Bopp-

30. Id. at 878, 882-84 (emphasis added).
31.
See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 1059, 1069, 1074 (1996).
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Neeley) or abhors it (I do not, I am an unwavering agnostic)-the overwhelming majority of state judges face some type of election.32
What kind of election campaign looms at the entry to the bench is a
significant filter affecting who will seek a seat or seek re-election. There
are differences between the average person who seeks to be a judge and
the average person who chooses elective politics. Politicians like campaigns, or at least tolerate them well. Politicians are out-going personalities ready for the rough-and-tumble. Of course views will differ about
"the judicial personality." In my view, the more wide-open and lively
(let alone nasty) are judicial election campaigns, the more would-be
judges will be hesitant or even unwilling to run for the bench or for reelection. For example: when the California Judges Association in 1983
sent its members a questionnaire about their campaign experience, one
judge's reply included this: "The best lawyers are not applying for judgeships because of lack of faith in the appointment process and they33do not
want to engage in political campaigns in order to gain reelection."
One example, even before judicial elections became "nastier, noisier and costlier:, 34 Pennsylvania's revered Judge Edmund B. Spaeth Jr.
("the kind of person a judge ought to be-a
sequoia in a Philadelphia
35
judiciary sometimes noted for its saplings"),
thinks electing judges is a bad idea, but it's not the reason that he
finds the process distasteful. "The worst thing is," he says with sadness baked on his face, "is raising money." He says "money" the
way a sick man says the name of his disease ....

[H]e announced

that he would not seek retention in [Novemberi because political
campaigning by judges is "fundamentally incompatible with the judicial process"-thus ending, prematurely, one of the most distinguished legal careers in Pennsylvania.36
That was long before White. Spaeth's approach, when asked how he
would decide cases, was to reply, "I can only tell you that I will decide
each case as conscientiously as I can.",37 Spaeth had originally been appointed to a vacancy and soon faced a contestable election for a full term
32.

See data infra note 5 1.

33.
AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS'
POLITICAL CONTRIBuTIONS: PART Two 17 (1998) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE] (quoting Roy A.
Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes

ofAmerican Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 app. b at 162 (1985)).
34. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless JudicialSelection Debate and Why it Mattersfor
Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1269 (2008) ("If Professor Roy Schotland
had licensed his characterization of judicial races ... when he made the statement in the 1980s, the
royalties would have made him a rich man today."); see, e.g., James L. Gibson, Nastier, Noisier,
Costlier-and Better, MILLER-MCCUNE.COM,
July
14,
2008,
http://www.millermccune.com/article/495 (using the phrase in applauding the changes).
35. William Ecenbarger, The Judge Who Wouldn't Run, THE PA. LAW., Oct. 15, 1985, at 23.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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but lost after unluckily drawing a poor ballot position; soon after, he was
appointed to another vacancy, ran again, campaigned vigorously
throughout the state, and won.38
The "judicial personality" has been studied by the presiding judge
of the San Bernardino trial courts, using the "most appropriate psychometric tool" (Myers-Briggs Type Inventory, "MBTI"). Studying more
than 1,300 American judges with the MBTI distinction between "extroversion" and "introversion" (differentiating between those "who tend to
be concerned with the opinions of others" and those who focus "on their
own thoughts and values"), the study found that about sixty percent of
judges are introverts, unlike two-thirds of the adult public.39
This should be no surprise, as the law, by definition, is an introvert's
design. It deals with core values and principles, and resists change
based on transitory shifts in the tide of popular public opinion.
Moreover, the judiciary calls to service those who are willing to apply legal values and principles even when the results are highly unpopular.... In our society, most introverted characteristics are disfavored. This may partially explain why the public tends to entertain
40
negative opinions about judges, believing them cold and aloof.
Of course these are only "broad caricatures of judges ....[N]o one fits
neatly into any one... category .... [V]ery few judges can be found at
the extremes. All types can be excellent judges; there is no 'best' type
for the judiciary. ''41
Strikingly, in a later study Kennedy found that nearly sixty percent
of female judges are extroverts, in contrast to only about forty percent of
male judges.42
Judge Kennedy's findings support the prediction-or fear!-that the
kinds of unrestrained campaigns that are the norm for politicians,
38.
39.
Summer
40.
41.

See id. at 25.
See John W. Kennedy, Jr., PersonalityType and JudicialDecision Making, 37 JUDGES' J.,
1998, at 4, 5-6, 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at9.
One former clerk for a federal judge, who very helpfully read this article in draft, wrote
this: "Frankly, the judge for whom I clerked, and for whom I have utterly immense respect as a
jurist, fits the MBTI test to a 'T' (excuse the alphabet pun). Were the federal judiciary elected, I
couldn't even conceive of the possibility of him as a candidate. That is not to say there aren't great
state candidates and great state jurists in elected states.... [Y]our article made me think of this in a
way that I never had previously ......
And one of the student editors of these pages: "I found [the judicial pool argument] to be
especially convincing as a more or less introverted person who has judicial aspirations-I would
never put myself through an election."
42.
John W. Kennedy, Jr., Judging, Personality,and Gender: Not Just a Woman's Issue, 36
U. TOL. L. REv. 905, 906 & n.2 (2005) (commenting on his sample, Kennedy notes, "I strongly
suspect that far more than 60 percent of the male judiciary is introverted"); see also id. at 906 n.2
(finding one sample of appellate judges to be "a whopping 76 percent" introverts). Perhaps this
difference between female and male judges is some of the reason why, in recent years, female candidates for the bench are generally deemed to have an edge over male candidates.
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would-for a significant proportion of the kinds of people likely to be
fine judges-be an entry barrierresulting in a weaker bench.
F. Public Confidence in the Courts

Allowing conduct like that in the scenes described at the outset will
jeopardize public confidence in the courts to a destructive degree. Situations akin to those above bring the risk, even the likelihood, that "outside
observers ' '43 (including lawyers and litigants) will see little or no difference between contributions and bribes. As Senator Russell Long put it:
"[W]hen you are talking in terms of large campaign contributions.., the
distinction between a campaign contribution and a bribe is almost a
hair's line difference.. .."44
How campaign funds are raised has become dramatically more important as campaign spending has soared. In the past four election cycles
(2000-2006), judicial candidates "have raised over $157 million, nearly
double the amount raised by candidates in the four cycles prior [1992-

43.
In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31,41 (Or. 1990).
44.
Quoted by the Courts of Appeals in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES
622-62 (1984) (writing before he went on the Ninth Circuit).
A Chief Justice sent me this comment on Senator Long's statement: "I never saw that a
campaign contribution bore much relationship to a bribe. Campaign money goes to consultants, TV
stations, printing companies, rent, etc. Bribes go into one's pocket."
Campaign contributions present several problems that must be separated: 1) They may
"buy" the kind of action the donor seeks. How large this problem is may depend on how large is the
contribution relative to the candidate's total funds, or how great is the concentration of such contributions (e.g., if a large proportion of the candidate's total funds come from people or entities who
want X action). 2) They may not buy or even influence action but only support a candidate who
will, if elected, take the kind of action the donor seeks with or without the donor's contribution.
(This motivation is supported by "the weight of anecdotal evidence at least", according to Kyle
Cheek, an academic authority, in an e-mail (on file with author) to Professor Vernon Palmer at
Tulane Law School, who is the author of a relevant recent article, on Oct. 21, 2008.) That raises
real problems of who reaches office but reflects upon the institution and the system, not the particular candidate. 3) A candidate may attack contributions to her opponent, depending on factors like
how much is raised overall, or how large or concentrated are particular contributions, or who and
where the contributions come from. Such attacks may be mere campaign moves or may point to real
problems. 4) Especially with judicial candidates, given the "neutrality" that judges are supposed to
bring to their job, contributions may reduce public confidence.
If judicial candidates face some form of election, they will have to raise funds. Campaign
funding may raise acute problems whether or not any direct contributions are problematic: Because:
even if there is public funding (as three states have for some of their appellate courts), instead of
direct contributions there may be "independent" spending to support X candidate; in fact, in several
of the highest-spending recent campaigns (e.g. in Illinois and West Virginia), a great deal or even
almost all of the spending was "independent", not contributions.
It is unrealistic and unfair to criticize any candidate whose contributions are within legal
limits (or, if there are no limits, are reasonable) and are unconcentrated, and if independent spending
is not significant in that race. Campaign funds in judicial races "unquestionably [jeopardize] confidence in the courts", which increases the need for knowledgeable observers to speak and write
realistically about this (quoting from Roy A. Schotland, Judicial elections in the United States: is
corruption an issue?, in TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2007 at
26, 29).
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1998]." 45 Since 2006, the sharp escalation has continued, setting new
records in many states; for example, in 2007 in a Pennsylvania contest
$9.5 million was raised and in Wisconsin $2.7 million, not counting major "independent" spending. 46
Many public opinion polls, both national and single-state over many
years, consistently show that large majorities of the public "believe that
campaign contributions have at least some impact on judges' decisions. 47 An interesting addition to those polls are the recent empirical
studies of voters' reactions to the post-White reduction of limits on campaign speech. These studies found little concern about the change in
campaign speech but high concern about campaign contributions.48 As a
Florida judge wrote shortly after the Eleventh Circuit panel wiped out
Florida's limits on personal soliciting: "What sort of appearance of fairness will be fostered by a system where judges are now expected to not
49
only go on the campaign stump, but go there with hands outstretched?"
II. FEASIBLE REFORM STEPs

This Canon, like all regulation (indeed, all law!), has strengths and
weaknesses. But first, is a Canon like this "merely a band-aid" that
leaves uncorrected the undeniably major problems raised by campaign
contributions to judicial candidates, and by having judicial elections at
all? If it were feasible to replace contestable judicial elections with another system, the matter would be very different. But despite the sharp
rise in concern about judicial elections since spending started soaring in
2000, with problems compounded by the intensifying of campaigns and
coarsening of campaign speech, states are not ending judicial elections.
Yes of course that may change. 50 But a century of experience is relevant.
45. See JAMES SAMPLE, LAUREN JONES & RACHEL WEISS, JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN,
THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006 app. at 15 (Jesse Rutledge ed., 2007),
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf.
Strikingly, the escalation in judicial campaign spending is far greater than in campaign
spending generally. See Brandenburg & Schotland, supra note 2, at 1230 (providing comparative
data). And, campaign spending matters in major ways even during uncontested elections. Id. at
1234 n.18.
46.
Data compiled and forthcoming by Justice At Stake, www.justiceatstake.org.
47.
Ten polls from 1997-2004 are cited by Thomas A. Gottschalk, Judicial Recusal as a
Campaign Finance Reform, Appendix, a paper presented at a 2008 Conference: Our Courts and
Corporate Citizenship (Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State of the Judiciary, at Georgetown
Law Center (publication forthcoming). The quotation is from the 2004 national survey by Justice at
Stake. A new nationwide Harris Poll, with input from the ABA, finds that fifty-five percent of the
voting-age public think elections should be used to select judges. See Poll finds most voters want to
elect
judges,
MINN.
LAWYER,
Oct.
24,
2008,
available
at
http://www.minnlawyer.com/type.cfmLegal%20News (scroll down for link, registration required).
48.
Gibson, supra note 6, at 60, 62-63.
49.
Charles Kahn, Will [Weaver] Leave State Judges with Their Hands Out?, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002.
50.
The 2008 elections produced local successes in Greene County, Missouri and also (for
interim appointments to vacancies) in two Alabama counties, joining six other Alabama counties. In
Missouri, "merit" selection (often referred to as "the Missouri plan") has been in place since 1940
for their appellate judges (and some trial judges), and since 1970 and 1973 for counties totaling
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First, in 2001, I wrote that despite all-out efforts since 1906 to change
from roughly eighty-six percent of state judges facing contestable elections, we shifted about one percent per decade on trial judges and about
three to four percent per decade on appellate judges.5' Second, given
how up-hill (to understate it) are efforts to end contestable judicial elections, that naturally attractive goal must not be allowed to distract from
work on feasible steps.
For those two reasons, the most feasible reform steps are ones like
(i) relying on the Canons; (ii) having appropriate limits on campaign
contribution amounts (as almost all states have although lacking coverage of aggregate contributions) 52 and on disclosure (as almost all states
about one-third of Missouri's trial judges. See American Judicature Society, http://www.ajs.org
/selection/selvoters.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2008); see also http://www.jud icialselection.us/judicial-selection/reform-efforts/formal-changes-since-inception.cfm?state=MO
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2008) (providing a history of reform efforts in Missouri).
Three recent statewide efforts are notable (leaving out places that don't get beyond a bill
being introduced). In Minnesota in 2008, a well-organized, strong drive to end contestable elections
failed when it was opposed by the trial judges. That effort may succeed in the next few years if
limited to appellate judges. Such limited systems are found in five states: California, Florida, Maryland, South Dakota, and Tennessee. In New York, both the high court and intermediate appellate
courts are appointive, but the intermediate appellate judges are appointed from the trial bench and
when their terms are up, must run for re-election. See ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 33, at app. 2. I
am among the people who believe that trial judges run greater risk of voter retaliation for unpopular
decisions than do appellate judges.
In Nevada in 2007, the legislature took the first step to switch from the state's current
nonpartisan elective system to a retention system for all judges. If the next legislative session approves, the change will go before the electorate in 2010. See AJS website noted above. (Without
implying any prediction, note that (a) Nevada voters have twice rejected such a change, and (b) in
recent years, voters in three other states have rejected, by large margins, ending contestable elections. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States' JudicialSelection, 95 GEO.L.J. 1077, 108182 (2007).)
But in Tennessee, their "merit" plan for appellate judges (which had been adopted by
statute) "sunsetted", effective in early 2009. In Spring 2008, the legislature failed to extend it and
so, unless the legislature acts in 2009, Tennessee will become the first jurisdiction ever to move back
to contestable elections. Richard Locker, Judicial selection system backed-Chief Justice Holder
againstgeneral elections, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Sep. 4, 2008, at B6.

51.
"In 2005, a conference of thirty-eight states' chief justices, justices, judges, and others,
sent to the CCJ a Call To Action that included this: 'The fact-which becomes constantly clearer
and more widespread-is that whatever may be the view of a state's courts and lawyers, "Don't let
them take away your vote" (to use the phrasing of ads in more than one state) has been an insuperable hurdle."' Schotland, supra note 50, at 1090.
For almost a century-starting in 1906 with a landmark speech to the ABA by Roscoe
Pound-the Bar, and so much more than the Bar, has given enormous energy to getting
rid of competitive elections. Back in 1900, roughly 14% of our judges did not face competitive elections. Today, after that century of major effort, we boosted that 14% to 23%
of our trial judges of general jurisdiction and 47% of our appellate judges. That's a shift
of 1% per decade for the trial judges, and 3-4% per decade for appellate judges. At that
rate we'll end contestable elections for trial judges in only another 770 years, and for appellate judges in only another 160 years.
Roy A. Schotland, Introduction:Personal Views, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1361, 1366-67 (2001) (introducing Call to Action and papers from National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection) (citations omitted). Updating the data to 2004, we find little change other than a slight increase in the
proportions facing contestable elections, because of the reorganization of courts in California and
Oregon. See Schotland, supra note 50, at 1092.
52.
See Roy A. Schotland, ProposedLegislationon JudicialElection Campaign Finance,64
OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 128-30 (2003).
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have although lacking coverage of "independent" spending); (iii) improving recusal when campaign-related connections loom large; 53 and
(iv) implementing unofficial steps like having campaign conduct committees and "educating" judicial candidates.54
As for the strengths and weaknesses of this particular Canon:
(a) Having a committee do the soliciting does not assure that the
judge or candidate is unaware of who is solicited and who contributed.55
We should go further, as the Minnesota Canon does almost uniquely, 56 to
explicitly prohibit the committee from disclosing to the candidate the
names of who did or did not contribute. But even such a provision is
porous. As a "distinguished Arkansas intermediate appellate judge" said:
I go out of my way to know nothing about the contributors.
I never look at the information in the official filings, I never
talk with my campaign committee about who gives what, I
don't have fundraisers, I really do all I can. But there I am

at a bar association dinner or some event, and lawyers come
up to me and in the middle of something else, eagerly tell
me that they gave
so-and-so to my last campaign. What
57
more can I do?
It would be cynical to believe that many judges, perhaps even most,
aren't trying as hard as they can to avoid all involvement in fundraising
and all information about their contributions. But it would be naive to
believe that it doesn't happen, even with some fine judges and to an extent that is troublesome-and the public surely is suspicious. 58
53.
Deborah Goldberg, James Sample, & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected
Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 528-30 (2007); Thomas R. Phillips &
Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and FairAppeals for Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a
Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 691,710-11 (2007).
54.
David B. Rottman, Conduct and Its Oversight in Judicial Elections: Can Friendly Persuasion Outperform the Power to Regulate?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1295, 310-12 (2008).
55.
A nationally respected trial judge (Judge Kevin Burke, formerly Chief Judge, Hennepin
County, Minnesota) sent me this comment:
Almost every candidate for judicial office runs the ad which lists the lawyers supporting
him or her. What does the public think? That judges don't look at their own ads? Or
that they don't look at the list of supporters of an opponent? Can I ask you to be on my
steering committee? Yes in every state. Can I ask the steering committee to go raise
money for me? Yes in every state. Should contributions be publicly disclosed? Yes!
Available on line so the public can see easily where the money came from? Yes for all
branches of government!!! Why then does anyone think the public is not at least going to
be suspicious that a judge might not go on line and find out who helped.
56.
Colorado and Utah (both with only retention elections) have similar provisions. ABA
TASK FORCE, supra note 33, at 40 n.73.
57. Id.
58.
A Mississippi judge reported a telling example:
In January 1997, at one of the [Mississippi] House of Representatives' committee meetings, a judge was asked whether or not having a big contributor bring a case before the
judge would give the judge cause to question the judge's own impartiality. When the
judge explained that under the Code of Judicial Conduct the judge would not know who
was a big contributor, there was disbelief on the part of the legislative committee mem-
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(b) What of the Canon's impact on the Incumbent-versusChallenger picture? Here, another distinction from White, as Simes
noted: "Implicit in the . . . opinions in White is that Minnesota's announce clause, partisan-activities clause, and solicitation clauses were
pro-incumbent. ... [This] Canon . . . does not have a pro-incumbent
character . . . ,59 Limiting candidates' "requests" obviously has more
impact on incumbents, whose "requests" carry more weight. As a Pennsylvania lawyer said in explaining his contribution to a local judge (to
[his]
whom many local lawyers contributed "although they doubted
60
qualifications"): "What could I say? He was a sitting judge.,
CONCLUSION

A Chief Justices' 2001 Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct
and the First Amendment adopted four principles (and also recommendations), starting with "Judicial elections are different from other elections.
." and ending with this:
Principle 4: Efforts to ensure that judicial campaigns remain different
depend ultimately on the success of steps to assure candidate professionalism and to strengthen the norms and culture that enable judicial
elections to fulfill their proper role in the balance of electoral accountability and judicial independence.
The Canons, campaign conduct oversight committees, education of
candidates and of the press, etc. all draw upon the deepest traditions
of the role of the courts and of the bar. Political campaigning places
most judicial candidates in unfamiliar situations, and involves challenging time pressures and incentives. The goal is to strengthen the
norms and the culture of judicial campaigns so as to protect the ability of state courts to meet61their responsibilities in our federal system
and under the rule of law.
Judicial elections exist to assure accountability in our pluralist democracy by putting choices to the voters. No one can be surprised that
democracy is not problem-free. Nor is it any surprise that among the
best answers to such problems are more active pluralism and more informed democracy. We must continue pursuing all feasible steps to assure that judicial elections bring an appropriate balance between judicial
accountability and judicial independence.

bers that anyone would be naive enough to follow those rules ....
be one of credibility or accountability ....

The problem seems to

Id.
59.
Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 247 S.W.3d at 883 (citing White
If, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005)).
60.

Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing:Are State Judges' Robes the

Emperor'sClothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 63 (1985) (citation omitted).
61.

The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct

and the FirstAmendment, 35 IN. L. REV. 649, 652-53 (2002).

